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Distorting Reason
Pierre Schlag, The Enchantment of Reason. Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. 160. $17.95.
Judges, attorneys, academics, even law students, have all been
caught within a spell-a spell of their own making. The leaders of the
profession voice its incantation with pride: We are united by "a faith
in the power of reason."1 This spell is insidious for it erases all
knowledge of its own existence. At least this is what Pierre Schlag
would have us believe in The Enchantment of Reason! Schlag claims
to have seen through the mists of this illusion, and he presents a
broad, skeptical argument that reason has betrayed the American
legal community. Schlag's skepticism is not merely the now
commonplace Holmesian position that "[the law] cannot be dealt
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics."3 It is a view that is affiliated with the Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) movement, the more ambitious descendent of legal
realism. Schlag takes as a starting point a central claim of the Critical
theorists: All legal texts, theories, arguments, and positions are
radically contextual in nature, and legal reasons are merely ad hoc or
post hoc rationalizations for prior "situated" beliefs. " Schlag treats
this claim as settled wisdom. The book, then, is best described as a
reaction to the recalcitrant members of legal and philosophical
academia who have remained loyal to liberal ideology and its
commitment to reason.' It seeks to explain to the Critical theorists
1. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 19 (1998) (quoting Anthony
Kronman, Dean of Yale Law School, as quoted in America's Best Graduate Schools, U.S.
NEWS &WORLD REP., Mar. 20, 1995, at 84.
2. SCHLAG, supra note 1.
3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Little,
Brown 1963) (1881).
4. SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 38-39; cf Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 19-25 (1984) (claiming that judicial decisions are predictable
despite the indeterminacy of legal principles because they are the result of common human
motives); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561,
570-73 (1983) (claiming that the absence of a coherent basis for the law results in the
unprincipled nature of reasons given within the law). Leading CLS scholarship is anthologized
in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989).
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why their colleagues remain unconvinced while at the same time it
attempts finally to win over the holdouts. Schlag thus has both a
descriptive and normative purpose when he argues that the
resistance to CLS jurisprudence is due to-and thus a demonstration
of-the same misplaced reliance upon reason that the Critical
theorists have been insisting is pervasive all along.'
Schlag contends that the traditional "rule of law" is, in effect, the
"rule of reason."7 The legitimacy of legal systems depends upon the
degree to which reason, rather than vengeance, self-interest,
prejudice, or arbitrariness, governs (or is perceived to govern) their
norms and their practice Schlag argues, however, that appeal to
reason cannot provide a satisfying analysis of legitimacy because the
conception of reason in American jurisprudence is fragmented into
two broad views. One view takes reason as the "central command"
of the legal system, the rigorous and unyielding mechanism by which
the artifacts of law are applied to actual situations and the
organizational force which guides the development of the legal
machine.9 The other view characterizes reason as a tool, used by
legal actors to impart legitimacy upon other non-reasoned forms of
belief such as experience, moral sentiment, and power."l The tension
between these two uses of reason in law gives rise to the traditional
hobbyhorse of the Legal Realists:11 that reason can be made to
support both sides of a legal debate. 2 Schlag offers no analysis of the
sources of this indeterminacy, but only presents an example of this
phenomenon. He suggests that balancing tests are paradigm cases in
which either side can be justified by reason, and reason, in effect,
PA. L. REV. (1993) (proposing and defending a position which claims that the success of the
liberal ideology does not demand determinism of reason, and only requires a qualified form of
objectivity).
6. See SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 15-17.
7. Id. at 20-22.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 26-29.
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 1-13 (1930) (claiming that
law is unsettled before a particular decision, thus presupposing that arguments could be made
on both sides); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 22-23 (1960) (claiming
that the given techniques of legal reasoning leave "huge correct leeways to produce variant
results"); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (listing
pairs of accepted principles of statutory interpretation that contradict each other). Legal
Realist writings are collected in the anthology AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W.
Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). Of course, the Legal Realists did not believe that all reasonable
arguments were equally valid. The validity of a legal argument turned not upon whether it was
a reasonable application of legal techniques of reasoning, but upon whether it met certain
policy or functional criteria. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935) (fleshing out the functional criteria for
judicial decisionmaking).
12. See SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 30-33.
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"runs out."'3 Pressure to maintain the rule of reason, however,
prevents legal actors from recognizing that reason does not provide a
determinate answer. Instead they dogmatically assert that reason
favors one side or the other,14 invoking the common phrases "it just
stands to reason," "good judgment clearly tells us," and the
economical "clearly."' 5 What is most disturbing about situations
where reason runs out, Schlag asserts, is the widespread belief
among academics and practitioners that these proclamations are a
function of reason and therefore a victory for the rule of reason.
Schlag refers to this uncritical acceptance of asserted reasonableness
as the "Noble Scam"'6 and finds that it is a pervasive phenomenon in
legal discourse.17 Because of widespread blindness or indifference to
the Noble Scam, reason often serves to legitimize and rationalize the
influence of vengeance, self-interest, prejudice, and arbitrariness in
the law. 8
Schlag offers two broad arguments for his claim that reason is
insufficient to determine legal questions. First, he argues that reason
is itself flawed and that its internal defects are reflected in legal
discourse. Second, he claims that certain aspects of legal discourse
are formulated in such a way that they undermine the operation of
reason.' Both the flaws of reason itself and the problematic nature
of the law hopelessly distort attempts to use reason within the law.
Further, Schlag argues that it is these same flaws in reason and the
law that, insidiously, obscure their own pernicious effects from the
sight of legal actors." This is the enchantment of reason. Schlag's
elaboration of each prong of his argument, however, displays a
pervasive inattention to important substantive issues and a failure to
recognize subtle, and not so subtle, differences in theories of the
nature and requirements of reason. A reader is constantly
confronted with arguments that make unjustified assumptions about
controversial issues, or which are cast in a blatantly mischaracterized
intellectual landscape. It is unclear what to make of such a work
because critical dissatisfaction with it is not focused on any particular
aspect, but is distributed across the entire project. Criticism of the
book, however, must necessarily be particularized. This Book Note
13. Id. at 31-32.
14. See id. at 33-39.
15. Id. at 30.
16. Id. at 38.
17. See id. at 33-39.
18. See id. at 38-39.
19. See id. at 60-91.
20. See id. at 92-125.
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therefore analyzes two instances of these faults and explores their
effect on Schlag's work. Because errors such as the two presented
below riddle the book, Schlag's entire project is compromised.
I
Schlag's first criticism of reason is an argument about "self-
reflexivity" - that is, that there is no way of placing reason upon a
non-question-begging foundation. It seems that any method of
justifying or criticizing reason must itself assume the validity of
reason. This apparent paradox is only interesting, however, if reason
is in need of justification. Schlag argues that it is. He suggests that
because reason is held out as regulating belief, it must be
distinguished from other "forms of belief' such as "experience,
custom, tradition, insight, intuition, revelation, disclosure, and so
on."22 Schlag concludes that reason must be held to the same
standards as other "forms of belief" because it is inextricably
enmeshed in belief.' He argues that reason depends upon belief in
several ways.24 The most important is that "[r]eason is itself a kind of
belief. Indeed, whether we are talking about the principle of
noncontradiction, or the idea that like cases should be treated alike,
we are talking about beliefs."' It is uncontroversial that we have
beliefs about reason, such as a belief about the law of non-
contradiction. It is also true that on the common understanding
reason operates upon beliefs. It is, however, far from obvious that
reason is itself a kind of belief. Consider the following argument that
reason cannot be a kind of belief, or more accurately, cannot consist
of a set of beliefs.
While Schlag never settles on one clearly articulated conception of
reason, any plausible account must hold that reason is at least a
method of deriving new beliefs from old. 6 Schlag appears to accept
this when he includes inductive and deductive reasoning-which
clearly fulfill this function-among several "types of reason. '
Consider, then, the following three familiar beliefs:
(1) If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal."
22. Id. at 58-59.
23. Id. at 61-63.
24. See id. at 61.
25. Id. at 62.
26. Or perhaps, on a weaker account, reason consists in bringing certain beliefs to
conscious attention using other beliefs already within conscious attention.
27. SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 76.
28. For simplicity I have particularized the common first belief, "All men are mortal."
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(2) Socrates is a man.
(3) Socrates is mortal.
Now, according to our working notion, reason is the method by
which we get from belief in (1) and (2) to belief in (3); specifically, it
is the means by which (3) is deduced from (1) and (2). Absent the
operation of reason, belief in (3) does not simply happen when there
is belief in (1) and (2). If reason consists only in a set of beliefs such
as non-contradiction and, in this case, modus ponens29-as Schlag
suggests-then the operation of reason in this situation results in our
original belief set being expanded to something like the following:
(1) If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
(2) Socrates is a man.
(4) From a belief set consisting of 'If A then B' and 'A', add a
belief, 'B.'30
Simply believing these three things (or as many more as you might
care to add), however, does not result in any new beliefs.
Specifically, it does not result in the belief that Socrates is mortal.
The belief (4) is a belief about how we do or should reason, it is not
the act of reasoning itself. Even if one had this belief set, it would
still be necessary to carry through on the reasoning process
recommended by (4) in order to arrive at (3).31 It is this process of
going from a set of beliefs to another, not any belief about such a
process, which comprises reason. This fact is commonly recognized
by the requirement that the processes of reason answer not to truth
and falsity, as do beliefs, but to validity and invalidity-on the
common version of validity, to truth-preservingness and non-truth-
preservingness.
This argument is obviously too simplistic. There is more to
reasoning than the formal processes of drawing logical conclusions
from past beliefs. The notion of reason that Schlag employs at times
29. In the propositional calculus, the term modus ponens applies to any inference of the
form 'If p then q, and p; therefore q.'
30. This example expands upon Schlag's concession that reason may be a "special" kind of
belief, or a "belief about beliefs." SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 61.
31. In fact, it would not be unreasonable, in the technical sense, to believe (1), (2), and (4)
and still not believe (3). While it would be unreasonable to believe (1), (2), and (4) and deny
(3), it is commonly accepted that reason does not demand that all conclusions permitted by the
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seems to be quite broad.32 Indeed it seems to include any process of
ratiocination- as distinguished from sensory impressions, emotional
reactions, hypnotically implanted beliefs, and so on. Even if reason is
meant to include this broader set of mental operations, however, it
must-as a de minimis requirement-encompass deductive and
inductive reasoning. In any case, it should be apparent-though it
will not be argued here-that even on this broader conception
reason consists of a group of mental operations, not a set of beliefs.
The discussion above, therefore, is sufficient to demonstrate that
Schlag's self-reflexivity argument begins with a faulty conception of
the nature of reason. Of course, in order to ask appropriate
questions about reason and justification-much less launch a broad
skeptical challenge-you must begin with a conception of reason that
accurately represents the subject of criticism. Schlag begins with an
inadequate conception, and his inquiry cannot legitimately proceed
upon such a foundation. If reason is not a set of beliefs then Schlag
has not shown that reason is in need of justification and his concerns
over self-reflexivity take no purchase. The point is not so much that
the position that Schlag adopts is ultimately wrong. After all,
someone might argue that it is appropriate to criticize reason by
treating it as a set of beliefs, namely beliefs about reason.33 Schlag,
however, offers no such argument because his mischaracterization of
reason does not reveal the need. The true objection to Schlag's
argument is that he draws such a tendentious conclusion too casually,
leaving its justification to a simple observation that fails to
distinguish between a belief about a thing and the thing itself?' From
such poorly reasoned premises, no conclusion can be convincing.
II
The second basis that Schlag offers for the failure of reason in law
is similarly sabotaged by Schlag's frequent inattention to central
components of his argument. Here he lays out practical ways in
which discourse in the law creates "predicaments" for any attempts
to rely on reason.35 Some of these practical effects are commonplace.
The misuse of reason to rationalize the expression of prejudice, for
32. See, e.g., SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 76 ("Reason, as has been suggested, is a way of
selecting, testing, monitoring, and replacing beliefs. Reason is a way of deciding upon what
moves to make-what pathways, what relations to create.").
33. Even this argument would not suffice for Schlag. The fact that reason should be treated
as a set of beliefs for purposes of criticism does not entail that it is in need of the kind of
justification that such a set of beliefs requires.
34. I suspect that ultimately the "justification" is supposed to lie in a cultural conception-
which Schlag assumes to be settled wisdom-that the nature of reason has been obfuscated by
the defenders of reason or by reason itself.
35. SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 92-125.
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example, is a universally acknowledged problem (which has a
solution in the correct application, not abandonment, of reason).
Some of Schlag's examples, however, are seemingly novel
predicaments having to do with common ways of conceptualizing
legal artifacts and forming arguments within the law. Unfortunately,
The Enchantment of Reason does not provide a satisfactory analysis
of these proposed difficulties. In the rest of this Book Note I wish to
pursue one of the possible defects of legal reasoning which Schlag
has perceptively brought to our attention but has failed to
adequately flesh out. This is only one example of the lack of
substantive engagement with relevant issues that is an unhappily
pervasive feature of the book.
Schlag claims that legal reasoning employs at least two
metaphysical aesthetics. The "subjectivist aesthetic" treats legal
artifacts as if they had intentional properties.36 Legal actors speak of
the "will" of the Constitution, the "intention" of a law, the
"animosity" of a decision, but no one believes that these artifacts
actually have the properties attributed to them.37 Similarly, the
"objectivist aesthetic" is the tendency to imbue legal concepts with
properties appropriate to physical objects.3" Legal operations, which
we label "balancings," lead us to conceive of legal artifacts, such as
interests and rights, as having "weight," "boundaries,"
"plasticity/rigidity," and "direction."39 Schlag contends that these
aesthetics are necessary to the law because they underlie its
purported objectivity and stability, while at the same time they
undermine its credibility because they are false representations of
reality.'
Schlag considers "as-if" jurisprudence, which claims that
objectivism and subjectivism talk within the law is merely
metaphorical and thus does not incur false metaphysical
commitments.4 As-if jurisprudence thereby attempts to reap the
stabilizing and objectifying benefits of these aesthetics without
incurring any commitment to the undesirable metaphysical thesis
that they seem to imply. 2 Denouncing this as an attempt to "have
their cake and eat it too," Schlag claims that this position leaves the
stabilizing and objectifying functions of these aesthetics without a
foundation. He presents only one argument to this effect:
36. Id. at 104.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 100.
39. Id. at 101-02.
40. See id. at 106-07.
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Again [within as-if jurisprudence] we run into the question:
Metaphor for what? If the "bindingness" of doctrine does not
come from the doctrine and if the "trumpiness" of rights does
not come from the subjective power of rights, then where do
they come from? Similarly, if the neutrality, impartiality,
universality, stability of legal artifacts do not come from the
objective character of law, then where do they come from?43
These are important questions-important beyond the domain of
legal discourse. Similar debates about the metaphysical status of
"abstract" entities have raged for centuries, even millennia.'
Mathematicians treat groups of things as if they comprise "sets" and
vectors as if they have "direction," but many of them deny that these
terms denote anything. 5 Questions about the ontological status of
numbers, for example, are still debated today.' Positions analogous
to the two that Schlag outlines, as well as many shades in between,
are advocated in these fields.
A more recent re-enactment of this debate has taken place in the
context of the possible-worlds analysis of modality. The only
satisfactory account of modal relations (e.g., necessity and
possibility) posits a domain of alternate universes, termed worlds,
and proceeds as follows:
(1) Blue swans are possible if and only if there is a world, w, such
that at w there are blue swans.
If we believe that blue swans are possible and we desire to remain
logically consistent, this analysis requires us to detach the antecedent
and conclude that:
(2) There is a world, w, such that at w there are blue swans.
Since w is obviously not this world47 we find ourselves committed
to non-actual worlds. Some have argued that we should accept such
43. Id. at 110.
44. One of the modem competing views is known as Platonism, see, e.g., CRISPIN WRIGHT,
FREGE'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBERS AS OBJECTS (1983) (defending Frege's Platonism about
belief in the existence of numbers), modeled after Plato's belief in the existence of abstract
"forms," see, e.g., PLATO, PHAEDO 93-155 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1981).
45. See, e.g., Gideon Rosen, The Refutation of Nominalism(?), 21 PHIL. TOPIcS 149 (1993)
(arguing against Fregean positions in favor of commitment to mathematical objects).
46. Compare JOHN P. BURGESS & GIDEON ROSEN, A SuBJEcr wrrH No OBJECT (1997)
(arguing for interpretations of mathematics that do not claim the existence of numbers), with
WRIGHT, supra note 44.
47. The truth of this particular claim about blue swans is unimportant. All that is needed is
the claim that some things that are possible are not actual, that is, they do not exist or are not
the case in this world.
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commitments to non-actual worlds because the practical benefits for
modal discourse are so tremendous.' Other philosophers find such
commitments too far at odds with common sense to accept. ' 9 Given
their commitment to the possibility of blue swans, however, they
look for ways to reap the benefits of the "possible worlds" analysis
while avoiding the ontological commitment that it carries on its face.
One vein of alternative theories is known as fictionalisms. °
The fictionalist accounts of modality build on theories of
pretense." One version makes explicit use of what is known as a
story prefix. Consider the following sentence:
(3) According to the Holmes stories, there is a brilliant detective
at 221b Baker Street.
No one thinks that believing (3) will commit you to the existence
of a detective, brilliant or otherwise, at 221b Baker Street; it doesn't
even commit you to 221b Baker Street, or to detectives for that
matter. Similarly we can offer the following versions within modal
discourse:
(4) Blue swans are possible if, and only if, according to the
possible worlds story, there is a world, w, such that at w there
are blue swans.
Now, if we detach the antecedent here, we are left with the
following sentence, analogous to (3), and entailing no commitment
to the entities mentioned within the story prefix:
(5) According to the possible worlds story, there is a world, w,
such that at w there are blue swans.
If this works, then the fictionalist has acquired the benefits of the
possible worlds analysis of modality without incurring unwanted
ontological commitments to strange entities like possible worlds.
Several difficulties for this approach have been raised in the
literature. There are concerns about the ability of such a story to
produce the facts that we think it should. Does the modal story
48. See, e.g., DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALrrY OF WORLDS 1-92 (1986).
49. See, e.g., Gideon Rosen, Modal Fictionalism, 99 MIND 395 (1990); Stephen Yablo, How
in the World?, 24 PHIL. TOPICS 255 (1996) (offering an alternative nominalist theory which he
terms metaphoricalism); cf Joseph Melia, On What There's Not, 55 ANALYSIS 223 (1995)
(arguing that the analytic usefulness of a proposed entity is not necessarily a reason to accept
its existence).
50. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 49.
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produce too many facts, such as facts about possible worlds? 2 Or
does it produce too few, leaving out things we think are possible? 3
There are also concerns about the justification provided by such a
story. People obviously care about the modal facts. They regret
things that might have been and hope for things that might yet be. It
is far from clear, however, that such deep concern can be based upon
a story about possible worlds.54 While it is not obvious that a
fictionalist account of modality can produce all the benefits of a
theory that elects to accept ontological commitment to possible
worlds, the debate is open. Similarly, if we read Schlag's as-if
jurisprudence as a type of fictionalist account, then it is an open
question whether such a theory can produce the objectivizing and
stabilizing functions that an ontological commitment to laws and
rights was supposed to allow. If a fictionalist account of legal artifacts
can produce these results then Schlag's two aesthetics pose no
dilemma for the legal actor. There is only the superficial appearance
of commitment to abstract objects. The legitimizing effect of the two
aesthetics comes, as it were, for free.
Schlag does not flesh out his as-if jurisprudence enough for us to
know whether he had in mind something like the fictionalist account
laid out above. The fictionalist account does, however, pursue the
same ends that Schlag attributed to as-if jurisprudence and arguably
meets them. While Schlag is ultimately concerned only with the legal
domain of discourse, his argument does rest upon a philosophical
thesis about metaphysical commitment and the appropriate basis of
justification. Such abstract criticisms of legal practice are
unconvincing, unless informed by plausible alternatives from
analogous work in the philosophical literature. As with his
conception of reason, the objection is not so much that Schlag's
position must be wrong, but that his cavalier endorsement of
tendentious views and superficial treatment of important issues
makes any conclusions he draws unconvincing.
III
The Enchantment of Reason attempts to explain why some
elements of the legal and philosophical communities have resisted
certain claims of the Critical Legal Studies movement and why they
52. See, e.g., Bob Hale, A Desperate Fix, 55 ANALYSIS 74 (1995) (claiming that the
semantics of the story prefix trap the fictionalist into commitment to possible worlds).
53. See, e.g., Stephen Yablo, Objects and Objectivity 4: Fictionalism 4-7 (Sept. 30, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (suggesting that the mechanisms for developing
the fictionalist story are inadequate to underlie certain claims about possibility).
54. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 49, at 349-54.
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are unable to see that the law's reliance upon reason serves only to
obfuscate and assist the exercise of power and prejudice. At the
same time it is, perhaps, an attempt to finally convert these tenacious
defenders of reason, to show them that their resistance to CLS is just
another result of the very problems which Critical theorists have
emphasized all along. Ironically, Schlag's work serves exactly the
opposite function. It reinforces the argument voiced by critics of CLS
that the issues raised are serious and worthy of study, but that
Critical theorists have done them a disservice by substituting trendy
jargon, impressionistic arguments, and attacks on the status quo for
careful argumentation, attention to detail, charitable consideration
of competing positions, and intellectual humility. Seen as the
alternative, Schlag's book is evidence that being under the spell of
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